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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EXECUTIVE
AUTHORIZATION OF WARRANTLESS
FOREIGN SECURITY SURVEILLANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment protects citizens from "unreasonable
searches and seizures."' To conduct a search, law enforcement
officials must obtain a warrant,2 which is properly issued only when a
neutral and detached judicial officer' finds probable cause to believe
that the search will reveal evidence of criminal activity.4 The Supreme
Court has held that searches conducted without a judicial warrant are
per se violative of the fourth amendment5 unless one of a few narrow
exceptions is applicable.6
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See generally N. LAS-
SON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 51 (1937); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361
(1921); Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional
Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316
(1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481-82 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 33 (1925). See generally Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.
47 (1974).
3. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. As the Court stated in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967):
There must of course be a nexus-automatically provided in the case of fruits, instru-
mentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus
in the case of "mere evidence," probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to
believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.
Id. at 307. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
96 (1964); United States v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950, 952 (3d Cir. 1970).
5. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1960); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493 (1958); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
6. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border search of
mail); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of automobile); United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (third party consent search); United States v. Robinson, 414
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A number of lower federal courts have recognized a foreign security
exception to the warrant requirement7 which permits the President or
Attorney General to authorize warrantless physical or electronic
searches in cases involving foreign agents or collaborators.' Although
the Supreme Court has yet to determine the constitutionality of this
exception,9 the Executive has assumed its validity. 10 This Note will
assess the constitutional basis of the foreign security exception along
U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to custodial arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (consent search); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (border
search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of moving vehicle); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1967) (frisk permissible where it is reasonable to fear that a suspect is armed); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (seizure of evidence in plain view); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967) (altered standard of probable cause for administrative search); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (inven-
tory search of automobile in long term custody); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(exigent circumstances); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (search incident to lawful arrest);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 549 (1927) (search incident to lawful arrest); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of moving vehicle). See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH &
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT. A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87-117
(1966); Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GEO. L. REv. 269 (1971); Sikina, Collateral
SearcA- 4 Survey of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 21 S.D.L. REv. 254 (1976).
7. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974);
United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United
States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'don other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); United
States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971).
Throughout this Note, "national security" refers to any threat to the structure or existence of the
government. "Domestic security" refers to threats to the structure or existence of the government
which originate from domestic sources, and "domestic security surveillance" refers to surveillance
which is prompted by such threats. "Foreign security" refers to threats to the structure or exist-
ence of government which originate from foreign powers, their agents, or collaborators, and "for-
eign security surveillance" refers to surveillance prompted by such threats. See Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976),
8. Cases cited in note 7 supra. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977) (specific authorization of President or Attorney
General necessary to invoke foreign security exception); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1975) (Executive must obtain a warrant where subject of
surveillance is a domestic organization not the agent of or acting in collaboration with foreign
power).
9. In cases where officials were required to secure search warrants for electronic surveil-
lance the Court has indicated that its holdings do not reach cases involving the President's foreign
affairs powers, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Giordano v.
United States, 394 U.S. 310, 314-15 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).
10. See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Department of Justice
asserts legality of warrantless searches related to foreign espionage or intelligence and authorized
by the President or Attorney General); Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, 3685 (1978)
(Carter administration provides for warrantless physical and electronic surveillance in cases in-
volving "an agent of a foreign power"); Wash. Post, May 19, 1975, at 2, col. 1 (Ford administra-
tion asserted that federal agents could conduct warrantless physical searches in foreign espionage
or intelligence cases).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/6
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with the constitutional validity of warrantless foreign security searches,
and examine recent efforts to legislatively limit Executive discretion in
this area.
II. FOREIGN SECURITY SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Historical Overview
In Olmstead v. United States," the Court held that wiretapping and
the use of information so obtained as evidence in a criminal trial did
not violate the fourth amendment. 2 The Court interpreted "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures"' 3 as meaning unreasonable physical
searches and seizures." Because wiretapping involved a nontrespas-
sory seizure of intangibles, it did not violate the fourth amendment. 5
Olmstead therefore precluded any constitutionally-based limitations on
nontrespassory electronic surveillance.
16
Congress reacted to Olmstead by enacting section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 19341' which prohibits the interception or di-
vulgence of "any communication" to "any person" unless authorized
by the sender.' In Nardone v. United States, 9 the Court held that
section 605 prohibited both governmental and private wiretapping,20
11. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12. Id. at 466. Olmstead was convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act by trans-
porting and selling intoxicating liquor. The government obtained its evidence by wiretapping.
Id. at 455-57.
13. See note I supra.
14. 277 U.S. at 466. Justice Brandeis filed a strong dissent stating that "writs of assistance
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with
wiretapping." Id. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See generally J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 6, at
200-05.
15. 277 U.S. at 466.
16. The Court distinguished cases involving an unauthorized trespass of the defendant's
premises. Compare Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (trespassory electronic sur-
veillance unconstitutional), with On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (transmission of
suspect's statement to officer stationed outside building constitutional), Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (trespass not in aid of electronic surveillance constitutional), and Gold-
stein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (attachment of listening device to wall to allow federal
agents to monitor conversations on other side constitutional).
17. Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 605,47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968).
18. Id. Section 605 provides, in pertinent part: "No person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communications to any person."
19. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
20. Id at 382.
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and evidence obtained in violation of the Act was inadmissible in fed-
eral trials.2"
In March of 1940, Attorney General Jackson announced that the
Department of Justice would discontinue the use of wiretapping as a
general investigative tool. 2 2 Two months later, however, in a
confidential memorandum, President Roosevelt stated that Nardone
was not applicable in cases involving national defense.2 3 He directed
Jackson to authorize wiretapping in such cases while limiting investiga-
tions "insofar as possible to aliens."24
In 1946, President Truman expanded the Roosevelt directive by au-
thorizing wiretapping in "cases vitally affecting the domestic security
or where human life [was] in jeopardy."25 The propriety of such direc-
tives went unchallenged in the courts because they authorized wiretap-
21. Id.; see [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2154. In the second Nardone case, the
Court, pursuant to its supervisory powers over federal courts, held the fruits of such searches
inadmissible at trial. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). See also Rathbun v.
United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (no violation where officer listening to telephone conversation
had permission of one party); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (statute does not render
evidence inadmissible in state courts); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (statute applies
to intrastate as well as interstate conversations).
22. Press Statement of the Department of Justice released March 18, 1940, dated March 15,
1940; see Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 199 & n.16
(1954). Jackson believed that wiretapping would have to be discontinued unless Congress
amended the statute. See Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63
YALE L. J. 799, 800 & nn.2-4 (1954); Rogers, The Casefor Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 795 &
n.14 (1954).
23. Confidential Memorandum for the Attorney General from President Roosevelt, May 12,
1940, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673-74 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976).
24. Id See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, WARRANTLESS FBI ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk. III, at 279 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
CHURCH COMM. REPORT III]. The Department of Justice further avoided the implications of
Nardone and § 605 by interpreting its prohibition as applying only to publication or divulgence of
information obtained through wiretapping, not to wiretapping per se. It permitted wiretapping
provided the intercepted information was disclosed only within the Department. Evidentiary
problems did not surface because the information obtained was never introduced at trial. See H.
SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 9 (1977); Brownell, supra note 22, at 197-99;
Donnelly, supra note 22, at 800-01; Donner, Electronic Surveillance: The National Security Game,
2 Civ. LiB. REv. 15, 18-20 (1975); Gasque, firetapping: A History of Federal Legislation and
Supreme Court Decisions, 15 S.C.L. REv. 593, 600-01 (1963); Rogers, supra note 22, at 794-95;
Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Jusification for Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elu-
sive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 749, 753-68 (1968). See generally CHURCH COMM. REPORT
I, supra, at 280-88.
25. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to President Truman, July 17,
1946, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Truman's notation of
concurrence with the Attorney General's suggestions appears at the foot of the memorandum),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/6
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ping for investigatory purposes only.26  Congress failed to pass a bill
limiting the President's authority in this area,27 and public debate was
stifled by the politically repressive atmosphere of the time.28
The Justice Department continued to authorize electronic surveil-
lance pursuant to the Roosevelt/Truman guidelines29 until 1965 when
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See generally CHURCH COMM. REPORT III, supra note 24, at
282-83; Donner, supra note 24, at 23-29; Theoharis & Meyer, supra note 24, at 760-63.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. See Gasque, supra note 24, at 599-601; Theoharis & Meyer, supra note 24, at 757-68.
28. See generally C. BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION 1945-60 (1973); R. CARR, THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 1945-50 (1952); R. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS
OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE (1970).
29. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT III, supra note 24, at 277-98. The table below, taken
from Justice Department records and reprinted in the CHURCH COMM. REPORT III, supra note 24,
at 301, shows the total number of warrantless FBI wiretaps and microphones in operation between
1940 and 1974.
Telephone Micro- Telephone Micro-
Year Wiretaps phones Year Wiretaps phones
1940 ................ 6 6 1958 ................... 166 70
1941 ................ 67 25 1959 ................... 120 75
1942 ................ 304 88 1960 ................... 115 74
1943 ................ 475 193 1961 ................... 140 85
1944 ................ 517 199 1962 ................... 198 100
1945 ................ 519 186 1963 ................... 244 83
1946 ................ 364 84 1964 ................... 260 105
1947 ................ 374 81 1965 ................... 233 67
1948 ................ 416 67 1966 ................... 174 10
1949 ............... 471 75 1967 ................... 113 0
1950 ................ 270 61 1968 ................... 82 9
1951 ................ 285 75 1969 ................... 123 14
1952 ................ 285 63 1970 ................... 102 19
1953 ................ 300 52 1971 ................... 101 16
1954 ................ 322 99 1972 ................... 108 32
1955 ............... 214 102 1973 ................... 123 40
1956 ................ 164 71 1974 ................... 190 42
1957 ................ 173 73
Attorney General Edward H. Levi testimony, Nov. 6, 1975, hearings, vol. 5, pp.
68-70. The statistics before 1968 encompass electronic surveillances for both
intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Those after 1968, when the Omnibus
Crime Control Act was enacted, include surveillances for intelligence purposes
only; electronic surveillances for law enforcement purposes were thereafter
subject to the warrant procedures required by the Act.
See generally Brownell, supra note 22; Theoharis & Meyer, supra note 24; Comment, Privacy and
Political Freedom" Application of the Fourth Amendment to "National Security" Investigations, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1205 (1970).
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President Johnson ordered that the use of wiretapping, as a general
investigative technique, be discontinued. 30  In 1966, however, the At-
torney General quali.ied Johnson's order, stating that wiretapping
would continue in cases "involving the collection of intelligence affect-
ing the national security. 31
B. Katz and Its Progeny
In its 1967 decision, Katz v. United States,32 the Court overruled
Olmstead, stating that the fourth amendment's reach could no longer
"turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion . . . ,33 It
held that absent prior judicial consent, electronic surveillance was an
unreasonable search and seizure.34  In essence, Katz equated a reason-
able search with one which met the warrant requirement or one of the
traditional exceptions based on unusual or exigent circumstances.35
The Court was not faced with a national security issue, therefore, it
reserved judgment on the exception's validity.36
Shortly after Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
30. Confidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from
President Johnson, June 30, 1965, reprintedin Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 674-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See generally CHURCH COMM. REPORT III, supra
note 24, at 285-88.
31. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to all United States Attorneys,
November 3, 1966, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. Id. at 353. Katz was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970), by transporting
wagering information interstate by telephone. In Katz, the Court declared that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 389 U.S. at 351. See generally Note, From Private
P/aces to Personal Privacy: A Post Katz Study ofFourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
968 (1968).
34. 389 U.S. at 358. The device in question in Katz was a bug rather than a wiretap, Bugs
are not restricted to use in intercepting telephone conversations. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 73-78 (1967).
35. 389 U.S. at 357-58. Stressing the need for a neutral determination of probable cause,
Katz rejected a government argument that the Court should except surveillance of telephone
booths from the warrant requirement. Id. at 358-59.
36. Id. at 358 n.23. Justice White stated that a warrant was unnecessary "if the President
.. . or... the Attorney General has considered the requirements of national security and au-
thorized electronic surveillance as reasonable." Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). Justice Doug-
las took the contrary position finding that "spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers . I..." ld  at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Douglas found the national security disclaimer a "wholly unwarranted green light for the Execu-
tive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive
Branch itself labels 'national security' matters." Id. at 359.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/6
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and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus).37 Although generally prohib-
iting warrantless government eavesdropping, 38 Omnibus expressly dis-
claims any attempt to "limit the constitutional power of the President
. . . to obtain foreign intelligence information. .. . In 1972, the
Court rejected the argument that this disclaimer constituted an
affirmative grant of power to the President,4" stating that "the Act sim-
ply did not legislate with respect to national security surveillance."4 1
Omnibus is therefore neutral as to the Executive's constitutional power
to authorize warrantless foreign security surveillance.
The Court limited warrantless national security surveillance in
United States v. United States District Court (Keith),42 holding the war-
rant requirement applicable in domestic security cases.43 Although it
stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial
judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably ex-
ercised,"'  Keith was expressly limited to "the domestic aspects of na-
tional security. '45  The Court has yet to decide whether a warrant is
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). Omnibus codified the guidelines for electronic surveil-
lance set forth in Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See generally CHURCH COMM.
REPORT III, supra note 24, at 288-89; Note, Electronic Surveillance, Title III, and the Requirement
of Necessity, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 571 (1975); Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
lance-Title III ofthe Crime ControlAct of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. Rv. 319 (1969).
38. Omnibus does not prohibit warrantless surveillance in certain emergency situations. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1970).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) reads:
Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional power of the Presi-
dent to take such measures as he deems necesssary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained
in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the
Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing
powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where
such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as
is necessary to implement that power.
40. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 306 (1972).
41. Id.
42. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
43. Id. at 321. Keith involved the surveillance of domestic groups that did not have foreign
ties but that allegedly threatened national security. Id. at 300-01. See generally CHURCH COMM.
REPORT III, supra note 24, at 290-93.
44. 407 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 321. The Court declined to express an opinion "as to the issues which may be
Involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents." Id. at 322.Washington University Open Scholarship
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required in cases involving foreign powers.
C. The Scope of the Proposed Foreign Security Exception
The present scope of the foreign security exception to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement has been shaped in part by its unique
history. When President Roosevelt first expounded the exception, he
was merely interpreting the Federal Communications Act of 1934.46
Because Olmstead held that wiretapping did not violate the fourth
amendment,47 Roosevelt's position was constitutionally sound, al-
though possibly vulnerable as an imprecise construction of the statute.
When Katz subsequently eliminated the distinction between physical
and electronic surveillance and held warrantless electronic surveillance
unconstitutional,41 the Executive continued to assert its right to use
electronic surveillance in cases involving national security. The Exec-
utive then asserted that his power was based on an exception to the
fourth amendment.49  Moreover, the elimination of the distinction be-
tween physical intrusion and electronic surveillance allowed the Execu-
tive to expand the foreign security exception to embrace both methods
of search and seizure.50 This expansion, however, has rendered the
foreign security exception more vulnerable to attack because the pro-
tection against warrantless trespassory searches is at the core of the
fourth amendment.5
46. See notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
49. See cases cited in note 7 supra; note 61 infra.
50. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
51. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 313; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516
F.2d 594, 618-19 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). In support of this point,
the court traced the fourth amendment's roots to Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). In Entick, the court quashed an executive warrant to search the home of a
political dissident. It unequivocally repudiated the validity of such warrants stating that "no
power" has the right to "break into a man's house and study to search for evidence against him
.d at 1038-39, 95 Eng. Rep. at 812, 817-18. See Boyde v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886) (Court indicates that fourth amendment was framed with Entick in mind). See also Leach
v. Three of the Kings Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr.
1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763). See generally J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 6, at 19-61.
The Supreme Court recently stated that "the Fourth Amendment's commands grew in large
measure out of the colonists' experience with the writ of assistance and their memories of the
general warrants formerly used in England." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977).
See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,
724-29 (1961). The writs, which were issued in the name of the King, were excessive warrants
permitting his agents to search virtually anywhere at anytime. See C. BEARD & M. BEARD, HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES 88-89 (1932); F. DiETz, A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/6
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If the validity of a foreign security exception is assumed, the inclu-
sion of physical searches is plausible. When Katz extended fourth
amendment prohibitions to electronic surveillance,52 there remained
little reason to exclude trespassory searches from the foreign security
exception. The only basis for such an exclusion would be that non-
trespassory electronic surveillance is potentially more intrusive than its
trespassory counterpart.5
3
At least one appellate court has recognized that both physical and
electronic searches would be included if courts recognize a foreign se-
curity exception. In United States v. Barker,54 defendants were ac-
cused of breaking into and physically searching the office; of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist.55 They asserted a good faith belief that the
break-in was authorized by President Nixon pursuant to his powers
over foreign affairs.56 The validity. of this defense depended on
whether it was reasonable to believe that in 1971 the President had the
power to authorize warrantless physical surveillance.57 Judge Wilkey
ENGLAND 387-90 (1937); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 48 (4th ed.
1970); J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 6, at 30-37.
52. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
53. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940,953 nn.39 & 40 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court noted
that a good argument can be made that nontrespassory electronic searches are more intrusive than
trespassory searches. Id at 953 n.39. It based its conclusion on the following passage from United
States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971):
Electronic surveillance is perhaps the most objectionable of all types of searches in light
of the intention of the Fourth Amendment. It is carried out against an unsuspecting
individual in a dragnet fashion, taking in all of his conversations whether or not they are
relevant to the purposes of the investigation and continuing over a considerable length of
time. If the government's "reasonableness" rationale [that warrantless electronic national
security surveillance is "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment] is
accepted in this case, then it would apply afortiori to other types of searches. Since they
are more limited in time, place and manner, they would be even more "reasonable."
546 F.2d at 953 n.39 (quoting 321 F. Supp. at 429) (bracketed materials added); see United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56
(1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 436, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also
Hearings on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977 Before the Subcomm on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1977)
(statement of John H. F. Shatluck) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]. See generalty Westin,
Science, Privacy, and Freedom Issues and Proposals for the 1970"s, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1003
(1966).
54. 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 943-44. Defendants were members of President Nixon's special investigations
unit. Under the authorization of John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs, they conducted a break-in and search of the office of Dr. Louis Fielding. Daniel Ells-
berg, a patient, had been suspected of leaking classified government documents. Id.
56. Id. at 945.
57. Defendants based their defense on a mistake of fact. They believed that President
Nixon had authorized the allegedly illegal surveillance. Although the court found this belief
Washington University Open Scholarship
406 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1978:397
held that their belief was reasonable58 because no court had yet pre-
cluded Presidential authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping in
cases involving foreign agents or collaborators.5 9 Furthermore, since
Katz had discarded the distinction between trespassory and non-
trespassory wiretaps,60 Judge Wilkey concluded that when the Court in
Keith reserved judgment as to the legality of warrantless foreign secur-
ity wiretaps, it implicitly reserved judgment as to the validity of
trespassory foreign security searches.61
III. EXEMPTION AND EXCEPTION
Those federal courts that have upheld the Executive's pover to au-
thorize warrantless foreign security surveillance 62 advance one of two
arguments. The first is that the Executive is exempt from judicial su-
pervision when exercising its foreign affairs powers.6 Although the
mistaken, it stated that defendants "honestly and reasonably believed they were engaged in a top-
secret national security operation lawfully authorized by a government intelligence agency." Id.
at 949. Thus, the issue was whether it was reasonable to believe that such authorization would
validate a search which was otherwise illegal. Id. at 949-50. On mistakes of law and fact, see
generally Hall, Ignorance andMistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1 (1957); Hentig, The Doc-
trine ofMistake, 16 U.IC.L. REv. 17 (1947); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in CriminalLaw, 88
U. PA. L. REv. 35 (1939).
58. 546 F.2d at 954.
59. Id. at 950.
60. Id. at 953-54. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
61. 546 F.2d at 952. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text. Judge Wilkey's deter-
mination that Keith reserved judgment as to the validity of both trespassory and nontrespassory
warrantless foreign security searches and seizures may also have been influenced by a memoran-
dum submitted to the Barker court by the Ford Administration Justice Department. It reads in
pertinent part:
In regard to warrantless searches related to foreign espionage or intelligence, the De-
partment does not believe there is a constitutional difference between searches con-
ducted by wiretapping and those involving physical entries into private premises. One
form of search is no less serious than another. It is and has long been the Department's
view that warrantless searches involving physical entries into private premises are
justified under the proper circumstances when related to foreign espionage or intelli-
gence.
Id. at 950. For Justice Department policy on surreptitious entries generally, see CHURCH COMM.
REPORT III, supra note 24, at 366-71.
President Carter has similarly defined the scope of the exception. Exec. Order No. 12036, 43
Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978) (Executive authorized warrantless physical and electronic surveillance in
situations involving "an agent of a foreign power").
62. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
63. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403
U.S. 698 (1971); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1971). But see
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
In Keith, the Court cited United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
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Constitution does not explicitly provide such an exemption, courts have
implied it from three Presidential powers:' the Commander in Chief
powers,65 the power over the nation's foreign relations,66 and the power
to protect the nation from foreign encroachment. 7 The second argu-
ment recognizes an exception to the warrant requirement based on the
need for efficient operation of the Executive's foreign policy-making
apparatus.68  This exception is rooted in considerations of judicial
competence to deal with subtle and complex foreign security issues, se-
curity risks, the nature of ongoing intelligence activities, delay, and ad-
ministrative burden. 9
A. Is the President Exempt From Fourth Amendment Strictures in
Foreign Security Cases?
In United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.,7" the Court stated
Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971), and ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 120-21 (Approved Draft 1971) for the propostion that "war-
rantless surveillance ... may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved." 407 U.S. at
322 n.20. See generally Shattuck, National Security Wiretaps, 11 CRIm. L. BULL. 7 (1975); The-
oharis & Meyer, supra note 24; Note, The Fourth Amendment and JudicialReview of Foreign Intel-
ligence Wiretapping- Zweibon v. Mitchell, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 55 (1976); Note, Foreign
Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARv. L. REv. 976 (1974); Note, Present and
Proposed Standardrfor Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 109 (1976).
64. On the President's powers in the area of foreign affairs, see generally L. HENKN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREION AFFAIRS AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POWER (1976).
65. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602-04 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). See also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871); Ebel v. Drum, 52 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass.
1943).
66. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§ 1, 2. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602-03 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1970),
rev'don other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). This power was broadly interpreted in Chicago & S.
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
67. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 500 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)). See also The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 638 (1862); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827).
68. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603-05 (3d. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974).
69. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 639-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); notes 80-146 infra and accompanying text.
70. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 64, at 24-26; Lofgren, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).Washington University Open Scholarship
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that the President has "plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations .. ". ."I' Tracing the government's foreign affairs powers
back to the cessation of British rule, the Court noted that even if such
powers had not been mentioned in the Constitution, they would have
existed "as necessary concomitants of nationality."72 The Court subse-
quently cited Curtiss- Wright in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman Steamship Corp.,73 for the proposition that
[t]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's or-
gan for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose re-
ports are not and ought not be published to the world. It would be
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should re-
view and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on informa-
tion properly held secret.74
Some courts have relied on this language to hold the Executive ex-
empt from fourth amendment judicial scrutiny when exercising its for-
eign affairs powers.75 Others have asserted that Executive decisions in
this area are either nonjusticiable76 or are to be accorded broad judi-
cial deference.77
Even though the President has "plenary and exclusive" power over
foreign affairs, at least one court has held the exercise of those powers
subject to the Bill of Rights.78 In Keith, the Court indicated that the
71. 299 U.S. at 320 (dictum). The issue in Curliss-Wright was whether a congressional reso-
lution granting the President authority to prohibit arms shipments to countries in armed conflict
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The focus of this Note is on whether the
President has the power to act without legislative authorization.
72. Id. at 318.
73. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
74. Id. at 111.
75. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970) (alternative holding), rev'don other
grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66, 72 (D.N.J. 1970), afjld,
494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). See also United States v. Smith,
321 F. Supp. 424,426,430 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (dictum). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594,
621-24 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
76. See Zweibon v. Mitchell 516 F.2d 594, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976).
77. Cases upholding a foreign affairs exemption generally find that in camera inspection of
surveillance logs is sufficient protection of the subject's rights. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d
165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970) (alternative holding), rep'don other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
78. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 621-27 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976). As stated by Professor Henkin, "[n]othing in the Constitution suggests that the rights of
individuals in respect of foreign affairs are different from what they are in relation to other exer-
cises of govermnental power." L. HENKlN, supra note 64, at 252. Speaking more directly to the
[Vol. 1978:397
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warrant requirement limited executive power in domestic security
cases.79 Unless the courts can develop a principled distinction between
domestic and foreign security, it is unlikely that the latter will be ex-
empted from the warrant requirement.
B. Is There a Foreign Security Exception to the Warrant
Requirement?
The Supreme Court has based exceptions to the warrant requirement
on considerations of practical necessity and public policy. 80 To with-
stand fourth amendment scrutiny, the foreign security exception must
rely on "special circumstances" which "necessitate a further exception
to the warrant requirement."81  The risks of judicial error, security
leaks, and delay are present in varying degrees in most kinds of investi-
gation. It is suggested that the distinctive factor in foreign security cases
is that the risks are much greater. Domestic threats, because of their
focus, can often be detected and neutralized prior to implementation,
whereas foreign threats may develop beyond our borders before the
government can act. Further, some have asserted that because foreign
powers possess substantially greater military strength than domestic
Bill of Rights, Professor Henkin states that "the Bill of Rights limits foreign policy and the con-
duct of foreign relations as it does other federal activities." Id. at254. Seegeneralyid. at251-
79; J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 6, at 19-48. Speaking of the President's power over foreign relations,
the Court noted in Curtiss-Wright that "like every other governmental power, [it] must be exer-
cised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 299 U.S. at 320; Zweibon
v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 621; see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)
("even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations, safeguarding essential liber-
ties"); cf New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (prior restraint of publication prohibited by first amendment even in national security
situation); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion) (Executive cannot nullify
constitutional prohibitions in trials of citizens abroad); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304
(1946) (unconstitutional to substitute military for civilian law even though Hawaii was allegedly in
danger of attack); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155-56
(1919) (dictum) (war power subject to fifth amendment); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
120-21 (1866) (sixth amendment right to jury trial viable during war); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1852) (government must compensate under fifth amendment even if
property is legally taken to keep it from the enemy); Expare Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.
Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (President cannot suspend writ of habeas corpus). But see Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (internment of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry con-
stitutional as emergency war measure). For a general discussion of these cases, see Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 626-27; Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87
HARV. L. REv. 976, 978-79 (1974).
79. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 6 supra.
81. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
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dissidents, they pose a greater threat to national security.
2
Certain domestic information, however, may also pose a grave threat
to national security. 3 For example, information on the planned sabo-
tage of a nuclear plant or a civil disorder is, of course, extremely impor-
tant. Yet, under Keith, domestic security surveillance is subject to
prior judicial authorization. 4 The critical issue, therefore, is whether
the grave risks and burdens involved in the more serious foreign secur-
ity cases justify an exception to the warrant requirement in all cases
where there is a substantial connection with a foreign power.
The D.C. Circuit in Zweibon v. Mitchell85 found that the asserted
justifications for a foreign security exception were insufficient. The
Jewish Defense League brought suit against the Department of Justice
for damages arising from warrantless wiretapping.86 The Justice De-
partment asserted the legality of the surveillance based upon prior au-
thorization by the Attorney General pursuant to executive authority
over foreign affairs.87 Former Attorney General Mitchell submitted
an affidavit stating that the surveillance was "deemed essential to pro-
tect this nation and its citizens against hostile acts of a foreign power
and to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
82. See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS:
THE NUCLEAR THREAT (1977);- STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RE-
SOURCES DEVOTED TO MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (1972).
83. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 629-30 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 818 (1974). The court in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976), rejected the argument that foreign threats are more serious than
domestic threats, stating that it not only relegates "the personal interests protected by the Fourth
and First Amendments to the level of second-class rights, it also naively equates all foreign threats
with such dangers as another Pearl Harbor." Id. at 646. Noting that the government has taken an
expansive view of its responsibility to acquire foreign intelligence information, Senator Joseph
Biden stated that such surveillance
might include not only efforts to counter Soviet espionage programs directed at our mili-
tary and defense secrets but the relationship of American oil companies to ARAMCO in
anticipation of an oil boycott. Positive intelligence could involve not only surveillance
to determine the Soviet Union's problems with its wheat harvest, but efforts on the part
of Soviet or Indian trade attaches to discreetly contact grain cooperatives in this country
in anticipation of seeking grain to supplement their inadequate harvests.
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1976,
S. REP. No. 94-1161, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FOREION INTELLIGENCE
ACT REPORT].
84. 407 U.S. at 321. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
85. 516 F.2d 594, 641-51 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
86. Id. at 605-06. Plaintiffs damages claim was based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal civil cause of action implied when government infringes
fourth amendment rights), and on Omnibus, supra note 37 (civil remedy under § 2520).
87. 516 F.2d at 607.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/6
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security of the United States ... 88
Judge Wright's plurality opinion rejected this defense, finding the
foreign security nexus too tenuous to distinguish the case from Keith.8 9
He also rejected the notion that Presidential foreign affairs powers are
exempt from the fourth amendment,' and discounted proposed
justifications for a foreign security exception.91 Although not faced
with the activities of a foreign agent or collaborator,92 the plurality
opinion indicated that "absent exigent circumstances, no wiretapping
in the area of foreign affairs should be exempt from prior judicial scru-
tiny, irrespective of the justification for the surveillance or the impor-
tance of the information sought." 93
1. Judicial Competence
The first argument considered in Zweibon asserted that the judiciary
is incompetent to deal with the subtle and complex issues of foreign
security.94 The court found this argument unpersuasive.95 Assuming
that there is a graver risk of error in foreign security cases, there is no
reason to believe that federal judges are insensitive to the delicate is-
sues and risks.96 As stated in Keith, "[i]f the threat is too subtle or
complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its
88. Id. at 607 & n.18 (affidavit of the Attorney General of the United States filed on June
12, 1971, in United States v. Bieber, No. 71-CR-479 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 1971)).
89. See id at 641-51. See also notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
90. 516 F.2d at 633. The court ruled for plaintiffs on both the Bivens claim and the Omni-
bus claim. See note 86 supra. But see Burkhart v. Saxbe, 448 F. Supp 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(Omnibus does not apply to national security surveillance).
91. 516 F.2d at 641-53.
92. Plaintiffs' activities ranged from peaceful demonstrations to acts of violence and in-
cluded the bombing of the Amtorg and Intourist-Aeroflot offices in New York. They were pro-
testing the restrictive emigration policies of the Soviet Union. Id. at 608. The Justice Department
asserted that the JDL's activities, which had provoked Soviet diplomatic protest, posed a serious
threat of retaliation against United States citizens residing in Moscow and therefore the use of a
warrantless foreign security wiretap was justified. Id. at 608-09.
93. Id. at 651. But see Hearings on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976 Be-
fore the Subcomra on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comnm on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976) (testimony of Attorney General Levi) [hereinafter cited as 1976
Hearings]. The Attorney General testified that while the "Zweibon decision ... has broad dicta
among its several opinions... its holding in fact was quite limited and consistent with Butenko
and Brown." Id. The Zweibon court further held that the surveillance violated Omnibus. 516
F.2d at 659-70. See Note, Electronic Intelligence Gathering and the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets 4ct of 1968, 44 FoR.DHAm L. Rnv. 331 (1975). But see Burkhart v. Saxbe, 448 F.
Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
94. 516 F.2d at 641-47.
95. Id. at 647.
96. Id. at 641-42. In the domestic security context, the Court stated that "Itlhere is no rea-
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significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable
cause for surveillance." 9
7
The court noted that the government could further protect its inter-
ests by seeking a warrant from whichever judicial officer it believed
would be most sympathetic to its position.98 Moreover, the government
may seek a warrant from a second judge should the first one fail to
authorize the requested surveillance. 99 The government already ac-
knowledges the judiciary's competence to conduct post hoc review of
wiretaps installed pursuant to the President's foreign affairs powers.100
Because the reasonableness of a search cannot be based on information
secured after it occurs, 10 1 there is no reason to presume that judges are
incompetent to examine a proposed surveillance before it occurs. 102
Finally, any judicial error would probably be in the government's
favor. 103
While the Zweibon analysis is structurally sound, there are problems
in its approach. In criminal cases, search warrant applications are
son to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved
in domestic security cases." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 320.
97. 516 F.2d at 641 (citing United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 320).
The Zweibon court found further support for the proposition that judges are competent to ana-
lyze national security issues in the congressional response to United States v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973). Mink interpreted the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), to preclude
judicial review of materials that the Executive refused to disclose under an exception to the act
which exempts from disclosure documents "specifically required by Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." Id. § 552(b)(1). Congress re-
sponded by amending § 552, specifically providing for in camera judicial review of exempt execu-
tive documents to determine whether they should be withheld. 516 F.2d at 642.
98. 516 F.2d at 645.
99. Id. at 645 n.147.
100. Id. at 644 (citing United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D.D.C. 1971) (recog-
nizing government admission that post hoc judicial review is appropriate in national security
cases)).
101. Id. at 644-45 (citing e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Washington v. United States, 414 F.2d 1119, 1122 (1969) (dic-
turn)).
102. Id. at 645.
103. Id. at 645 n.146; f Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111, 114 (1948) (executive decision granting or denying the right to engage in overseas air trans-
portation 'nonreviewable because 'executive foreign policy decisions are political not judicial);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S..81, 100 (1943) (internment of United States citizens of
Japanese ancestry constitutional as emergency war measure); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936) (dictum) (President's "plenary and exclusive" power over
foreign affairs not limited to powers specifically enumerated in Constitution); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (government's recognition of foreign power unreviewable
because foreign relations are committed to "the political" branches of the federal government).
See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 64, at 205-25. See also cases cited in note 7 supra.
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often rubber stamped."° Given the complexity of some foreign security
issues and the government's ability to approach the most sympathetic
judges with multiple warrant applications,"°5 judicial deference would
tend to be greater in foreign security cases. Under these circumstances,
the warrant requirement could become meaningless form.
In May, 1977, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced S. 1566, a bill
designed to curb governmental abuse of judicial warrant procedures in
cases involving foreign intelligence surveillance. 6 The bill provides
that the Chief Justice of the United States shall select seven federal
district judges to hear foreign security warrant applications, 10 7 and
three judges from either the federal district courts or courts of appeals
to serve as a special court of appeals.0 8 If an application is denied, the
government could seek review in the special court of appeals, and upon
further denial, in the Supreme Court. 0 9 The application could not be
filed in any other court." 0
104. See generally H. ScHwARTz, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 23-26 (1977).
105. The fourth amendment contemplates a "neutral and detached magistrate" rather than a
sympathetic judge. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). As set forth in Zweibon,
if a judge refuses to grant a warrant, the government can go to another judge. See notes 98-99
supra and accompanying text. Under such circumstances the warrant requirement would impose
a meaningless burden on the government; it would eventually secure a warrant.
106. S. 1566, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1566]. See also H.R. 7308,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (House version of S. 1566). On April 20, 1978, the Senate passed S.
1566 by a vote of 95 to I. See N.Y. Times, April 21, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). S. 1566
provides:
(a) The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate seven district court
judges, each of whom shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders
approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States under the pro-
cedures set forth in this chapter, except that no judge designated under this subsection
shall have jurisdiction of the same application for electronic surveillance under this
chapter which has been denied previously by another judge designated under this sub-
section. If any judge so designated denies an application for an order authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance under this chapter, such judge shall provide immediately for the
record a written statement of each reason for his decision and, on motion of the United
States, the record shall be transmitted, under seal, to the special court of review estab-
lished in subsection (b).
(b) The Chief Justice shall publicly designate three judges, one of whom shall be pub-
licly designated as the presiding judge, from the United States district courts or courts of
appeals who together shall comprise a special court of review which shall have jurisdic-
tion to review the denial of any application made under this chapter. If such special
court determines that the application was properly denied, the special court shall imme-
diately provide for the record a written statement of each reason for its decision and, on
petition to the United States for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be transmitted under
seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision.
107. S. 1566, supra note 106, subsection (a).
108. Id. subsection (b).
109. Id.
110. "Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance under this chapter shall
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Assuming the Chief Justice would select judges on the basis of past
performance and expertise in foreign security cases, II1 the integrity of
the selection process should allay fears of judicial incompetence in this
area. By limiting the number of judges to whom a warrant application
could be presented and eliminating duplicate applications, S. 1566
would protect the substance behind a warrant requirement. The prac-
tice of shopping for a sympathetic forum would be halted; fourth
amendment rights and the governmental interest in national security
would be protected without recognizing an exception to the warrant
requirement.
2. Security Risks
The D.C. Circuit next considered the security risks involved in con-
veying foreign security information to judicial officers." 12  Although
the Supreme Court rejected this consideration in a case involving do-
mestic security, 3 it is possible that greater risks are involved in foreign
security cases.1 14 Yet, the court in Zweibon rejected this contention." 5
Warrant proceedings are conducted ex parte. Further, the government
can protect its interests by seeking the warrant only from judges it
trusts to be discrete.
Any security problems posed by the presence of judicial administra-
tive personnel can be eliminated by having the government provide the
necessary clerical personnel. 1" Given the number of people already in-
volved in such decisions, the additional review of a federal judge
"poses a miniscule marginal risk of a security breach."'"1 7
be made by a Federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction
under section 2523 of this chapter." Id. § 2524.
111. The bill fails to provide criteria for selecting foreign security judges. While common
sense and the discretion of the Chief Justice would seem to dictate that experience and trustwor-
thiness be prerequisites, Congress should include definitive guidelines prior to passage.
112. 516 F.2d at 647-48.
113. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 320-21.
114. See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
115. 516 F.2d at 647.
116. Id. See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 321 (approving a
similar procedure in the domestic security context). See generally Note, The 'Wational Security
WiFretap"- PresidentialPrerogative or JudicialResponsiblity'?, 45 S. CAL. L. Rv. 888, 901 (1972).
117. 516 F.2d at 647 n.157. The court cited a statement by former Attorney General Saxbe
indicating that numerous individuals within the FBI and the Department of Justice are involved
in the process of deciding whether surveillance will be initiated. Id. at 643. See Hearings on
Electronic Surveillancefor National Security Purposes Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures and Constitutional .R'ghts ofthe Senate Com. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 235
(1974) (testimony of Attorney General Saxbe).
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Under S. 1566, warrant proceedings would continue to be conducted
ex parte. 118 The bill further provides that such proceedings should be
conducted expeditiously and that the court records be sealed and se-
curely maintained. 119 Unfortunately, S. 1566 fails to provide for gov-
ernment supplied administrative personnel; however, in light of
Supreme Court approval of such a procedure 120 and the lack of an ex-
press prohibition in S. 1566, an Executive request for this safeguard
would probably be approved.' 21 The Chief Justice would certainly be
aware of the need for trustworthiness when selecting foreign security
judges; 2 2 it is therefore highly unlikely that among seven carefully se-
lected judges, the government would be unable to secure discrete re-
view.
Given the analysis in Zweibon and the procedures set forth in S.
1566, the security risks posed by a warrant requirement would be mini-
mized. Apart from S. 1566, Zweibon found existing safeguards
sufficient. The Executive, Congress, and the Court could resolve any
remaining security problems by establishing appropriate procedural
safeguards; therefore, a security risk justification for an exception to
the warrant requirement is unpersuasive.
3. Ongoing Inteligence-Gathering Activities
A third argument considered in Zweibon asserted a distinction be-
tween ongoing foreign security surveillance aimed at collecting strate-
gic intelligence information and surveillance aimed at criminal
prosecution. 123  The government argued that because foreign security
surveillance is not directed to securing evidence for use in a criminal
prosecution, it is less offensive to fourth amendment values and there-
fore should be accorded greater judicial deference. 124 The court, how-
118. S. 1566, supra note 106, § 2525 (a).
119. Id. § 2523(c).
120. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 321.
121. The Chief Justice probably could establish this procedure pursuant to the authorization
to create security measures. S. 1566, supra note 106, § 2523(c). Because the bill provides that the
records of proceedings are to be maintained under these security measures, it appears that the
Chief Justice's authority would extend to the ex parte hearing.
122. See note 111 supra.
123. 516 F.2d at 648-49.
124. In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Attorney General Levi attempted to distinguish intelli-
gence from law enforcement surveillance, asserting that the former requires fewer constitutional
safeguards. According to Levi:
The effect of a government intrusion on individual security is a function, not only of the
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ever, rejected this rationale.125 Successful foreign security surveillance
is likely to uncover evidence of criminal activity such as espionage,1 26
treason, 27 or sabotage.12s The government has demonstrated its will-
ingness to use the fruits of such surveillance in criminal prosecutions; 29
therefore, any distinction based on whether the aim of the surveillance
is investigatory or evidentiary is unpersuasive. Furthermore, the fourth
amendment protects privacy interests 30 which will be invaded regard-
less of the aim of the surveillance. 13 1  The ongoing nature of foreign
security surveillance merely increases the invasion by prolonging the
intrusion.'3 2 Under S. 1566, information obtained by judicially ap-
proved foreign security surveillance concerning a United States citizen
or resident alien may be used "for the enforcement of the criminal law
intrusion's nature and circumstances, but also of disclosure and of the use to which its
product is put. Its effects are perhaps greatest when it is employed or can be employed
to impose criminal sanctions or to deter, by disclosure, the exercise of individual free-
doms. In short, the use of the product seized bears upon the reasonableness of the search.
Hearings on Intelligence 4ctivities Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Opera-
tions With Respect to IntelligenceActivites, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1975) (testimony of Attorney
General Levi) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
125. 516 F.2d at 648-49.
126. 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99 (1970).
127. Id. §§ 2381-91 (1970) (also covering sedition and subversive activities).
128. Id. §§ 2151-57.
129. 516 F.2d at 648. See Hearings on Electronic Surveillancefor National Security Purposes
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures and Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1974) (testimony of J. Shattuck); id. at 330-33
(testimony of W. Bender). Aside from seeking criminal evidence, the national security rationale
is sometimes used to obtain information for personal political gain. See HousE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP.
No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 146-57 (1974); CHURCH COMM. REPORT III, supra note 24, at
312-15; 119 CONG. REc. 41864 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Nelson). As stated by former Attorney
General Levi:
An officer who has obtained a warrant based upon probable cause to search for par-
ticular items may in conducting the search necessarily have to examine other items, some
of which may constitute evidence of an entirely distinct crime. The normal rule under
the plain view doctrine is that the officer may seize the latter incriminating items as well
as those specifically identified in the warrant so long as the scope of the authorized
search is not exceeded.
1975 Hearings, supra note 124, at 100-01 (testimony of Attorney General Levi).
130. 516 F.2d at 648-49. Interpreting the holding in Katz, Justice Harlan stated that "a per-
son has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy .. " Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
131. 516 F.2d at 649; see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see generally Denenberg, Administrative Searches and the Right to
Privacy in the United States, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 169 (1974); Note, Administrative Search
Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REv. 607 (1974). But see 1975Hearings, supra note 124, at 97-98 (testi-
mony of Attorney General Levi).
132. 516 F.2d at 649.
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if its use outweighs the possible harm to national security," and the
Attorney General approves its use in advance. 3 Realistically, any
broad prohibition on government use of such information would be
unenforceable. The government could easily utilize illegally obtained
leads to secure admissible evidence.
The government has demonstrated that it will, in criminal prosecu-
tions, use information obtained from foreign security surveillance. 34
The assertion that such surveillance is less intrusive because it is not
aimed at discovering criminal activity, therefore, has little validity. But
apart from that distinction, Zweibon recognized that ongoing surveil-
lance violates legitimate privacy interests. As such, it should be subject
to fourth amendment strictures.
4. Delay
The government asserted that the delay inherent in the warrant pro-
cedure might result in a loss of information essential to national secur-
ity.' 35 Yet, competent foreign security operations require careful and
lengthy planning. 136  Ample time should exist for obtaining a warrant.
If exigent circumstances should arise, a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement based on practical necessity would apply. 37  It
133. S. 1566, supra note 106, § 2526 (a) & (b). The bill provides:
(a) Information concerning United States persons acquired from an electronic sur-
veillance conducted pursuant to this chapter may be used and disclosed by Federal
officers and employees without the consent of the United States person... for the
enforcement of the criminal law if its use outweighs the possible harm to national secur-
ity. No otherwise privileged communication obtained in accordance with, or in viola-
tion of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.
(b) The minimization procedures under this chapter shall not preclude the retention
and disclosure, for law enforcement purposes, of any information which constitutes evi-
dence of a crime if such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such evidence, or
any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the
advanced authorization of the Attorney General.
Id.
134. See note 129 supra.
135. 516 F.2d at 649.
136. Attorney General Saxbe set out detailed requirements for obtaining authorization of for-
eign security surveillance. If a request for warrantless surveillance originates in an FBI field
office, the proposal will be considered by eleven levels of supervision before it reaches the Attor-
ney General's office. Hearings on Electronic Surveillancefor National Security Purposes Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures and Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1974) (testimony of Attorney General Saxbe). See 516
F.2d at 643.
137. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances exception); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (exigent circumstances exception). S. 1566, supra note 106,
§ 2525(d), also provides an exigent circumstances exception. The exception applies when the At-
torney General reasonably determines that:
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would therefore be illogical to grant a special exception for all foreign
security cases simply because some may involve emergency situations
when those situations are covered by an existing exception.
5. Administrative Burden
Zweibon rejected the administrative burden argument as it applies to
both the judiciary and the Executive. 3 ' Regarding the judiciary, the
argument is that the complexity and seriousness of foreign security
make these cases unduly burdensome and that the present caseload is
so heavy that it should not be further saddled.139 Essentially, the com-
plexity argument is one of judicial competence and was resolved in
favor of the judiciary in a preceding section of the Zweibon decision.' 40
Regarding the effect on already heavily burdened caseloads, the court
maintained that it is the task of the courts to deal with complex is-
sues. 14 1 A case otherwise subject to judicial review cannot be avoided
for reasons of mere convenience. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall,
the courts have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."' 42
For the Executive, there are admittedly greater administrative bur-
dens involved in securing a warrant than in conducting surveillance
independent of judicial supervision.143  The burden of securing prior
approval, however, is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement. 44 As noted in Zweibon, the government has asserted
(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic sur-
veillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such sur-
veillance can with due diligence be obtained, and
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this chapter to approve such
surveillance exists, he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveil-
lance if a judge designated pursuant to section 2523 of this chapter is informed by the
Attorney General or his designate at the time of such authorization that the decision has
been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accord-
ance with this chapter is made to that judge as soon as practical, but not more than
twenty-four hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.
Id. § 2525(d)(1) & (2).
138. 516 F.2d at 650-51.
139. Id. at 650.
140. See notes 94-103 supra and accompanying text.
141. 516 F.2d at 650-51.
142. Id. at 651 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 262, 404 (1821)).
143. Id.
144. Id. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,259 n.7 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Mere administrative inconvenience... cannot justify invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.");
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 n.16 (1969) (state's argument that it would be "unduly
burdensome to obtain a warrant specifying" items to be seized, rejected as meritless).
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that the number of foreign security wiretaps is small.145 The costs and
burdens of securing a warrant in appropriate cases should therefore be
proportionally small.'4
IV. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
A. The Church Committee
In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Opera-
tions With Respect to Intelligence Activities147 proposed that all non-
consensual electronic surveillance of citizens and resident aliens be
conducted under judicial warrants1 48 issued pursuant to Omnibus.149
The Committee proposed that less stringent standards be applied when
a warrant is sought for the electronic surveillance of foreigners.'50
Courts could issue these warrants when there is probable cause for be-
lieving the "target is an officer, employee, or conscious agent of a for-
eign power,"'' l the Attorney General certifies that foreign security
information essential to the national security is "likely" to be re-
145. 516 F.2d at 651 n.182. The following table of national security wiretaps was compiled
from White House figures and printed in Schwartz, Reflectionson Six Years of LegitimatedElec-
ironic Surveillance in PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY 38 (1974) (final report of The Annual Chief
Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States):
1945-519 1959-120
1946-346 1960-115
1947-374 1961-140
1948-416 1962-198
1949-471 1963-244
1950-270 1964-260
1951-285 1965-233
1952-285 1966-174
1953-300 1967-113
1954-322 1968- 82
1955-214 1969-123
1956-164 1970-102
1957-173 1971-101
1958-166 1972-108
Id. at 51. Professor Schwartz noted that the figures used in assembling this table were "under-
stated, fragmentary and ambiguous." Id.
146. 516 F.2d at 651 n.182.
147. SENATE SELECT Comm. To STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIvITIEs AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
bk. II, at 327-28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHURCH CoMm. REPORT II].
148. Id. at 327 (Recommendation 51).
149. Id. (Recommendation 52). For a discussion of the procedures mandated by Omnibus,
see note 165 infra.
150. CHURCH COMM. REPORT I, supra note 147, at 327 (Recommendation 52). As to the
constitutionality of distinguishing between United States citizens and foreigners, see notes 190-99
ry/ra and accompanying text.
151. CHURCH COMM. REPORT II, supra note 147, at 327 (Recommendation 52).
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vealed,152 and the issuing judge adopts "procedures to minimize the
acquisition and retention of nonforeign intelligence information about
Americans."' 53 To protect foreign security information, the Commit-
tee proposed that foreign security electronic surveillance "should be ex-
empt from the disclosure requirements of [Omnibus] as to foreigners
generally" and Americans "involved in hostile foreign intelligence ac-tivities.""5
Regarding physical surveillance, the Committee stated that
"[u]nauthorized entry should be conducted only upon judicial warrants
issued on probable cause to believe that the place to be searched con-
tains evidence of a crime .. ."155 The Committee's recommendation,
however, would allow surreptitious entry "against foreigners who are
officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power," if con-
ducted pursuant to a judicial warrant issued under the less stringent
standards applicable in cases involving electronic surveillance of for-
eigners.156
B. Proposed Bills
In March, 1976, Senator Edward Kennedy, supported by Attorney
General Edward H. Levi, introduced S. 3197.- 57 This bill would permit
the issuance of a warrant for electronic surveillance of foreign
agents-defined as including American citizens and resident
aliens' 58-- upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the target is
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 328. Omnibus requires the issuing judge to notify the subject of electronic sur-
veillance within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days from the expiration of the war-
rant. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (8)(d) (1970). Omnibus further requires that the issuing judge, "upon the
filing of a motion, may in his discretion make available to [the subject of electronic surveillance
or] his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communications, applications and
orders as the judge determines to be in the interest ofjustice." CHURCH COMM. REPORT II, supra
note 147, at 328.
155. CHURCH COMM. REPORT II, supra note 147, at 328 (Recommendation 54).
156. Id. See notes 150-53 supra and accompanying text.
157. S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. 3197]. See FOREIGN INTEL-
LIGENCE ACT REPORT, supra note 83, at 13. Prior to S. 3197, numerous foreign security bills had
been proposed. See, e.g., S.743,94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); S. 1888, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
H.R. 141, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2603, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3133, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 3855, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975); H.R. 3874, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See generaly Note, Present and Proposed Stand-
ardrfor Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 109 (1976).
158. The bill defines "agent of a foreign power" as
(i) a person who is not a permanent resident alien or citizen of the United States and
who is an officer or employee of a foreign power;, or
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a foreign agent.' 59  It fails to require either certification by the Attor-
ney General that foreign intelligence information essential to national
security is likely to be obtained, or a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that such information may be found at the place to be searched. 160
Furthermore, the bill disclaims any limitation on the President's power
to procure foreign intelligence information if it is acquired by means
other than electronic surveillance; or the circumstances "are so unprec-
edented and potentially harmful to the Nation that they cannot be rea-
sonably said to have been within the contemplation of Congress.' 1
6
'
S. 3197 would provide a warrant requirement in foreign security
electronic surveillance cases. 162 It would, however, expand the defined
group of foreign security surveillance targets by encompassing United
States citizens and resident aliens 163 while permitting surveillance of
this expanded group without probable cause to believe the surveillance
would reveal foreign security information.1t  Furthermore, the proce-
dural safeguards of S. 3197 are inadequate. The bill would permit
nonconsensual surveillance of citizens and resident aliens without ad-
(ii) a person who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, is engaged in clandes-
tine intelligence activities, sabotage, or terrorist activities, or who conspires with, or
knowingly aids or abets such a person in engaging in such activities.
S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2521(b)(1).
159. See id. §§ 2522-25. As stated in the Senate report:
S. 3197 amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter after chapter 119,
entitled "Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Pur-
poses." The bill requires a warrant for any electronic surveillance conducted for foreign
intelligence purposes of law enforcement. The combined effects of chapter 119 and this
new chapter, if enacted, would be to require a warrant for any electronic surveillance
conducted within the United States.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACT REPORT, supra note 83, at 13-15 (Summary of the Legislation).
The bill requires that the presiding judge find, on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant,
probable cause to believe that, "(i) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power, and, (ii) the facilities or place at which the electronic surveillance is
directed are being used, or are about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
." S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2525(a)(3).
160. The bill requires that an executive officer certify that: "the information sought is foreign
intelligence information;" "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence infor-
mation;" and "that such information cannot feasibly be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques." Id § 2524(a)(8) (A,B, & C). Senator Joseph Biden expressed doubts as to the
oonstitutionality of a bill which "says in effect that where there is probable cause that the subject
of a search is engaged in criminal activity there is no need to satisfy the judge that the search will
seize evidence of criminal activity.. "FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACT REPORT, supra note 83, at
71-72.
161. S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2528(a) & (b).
162. See note 159 supra.
163. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 160 supra.Washington University Open Scholarship
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herence to certain Omnibus procedures.165 It specifically provides that
its procedures "shall not preclude . . . disclosure, for law enforcement
purposes, of any information which constitutes evidence of a
crime .. ."166 In light of the frequency with which the government
uses such surveillance to obtain evidence of criminal activity,1 67 this
provision is contrary to the Church Committee's preference for the pro-
tections of Omnibus.16
8
The bill does not provide any procedural protection from physical
surveillance. 69 Its disclaimer as to inherent Presidential powers to
conduct surveillance by means other than electronic surveillance 70
raises questions of congressional interpretation of Presidential power in
foreign security cases. If S. 3197 becomes law, the Executive would
certainly continue to assert the validity of warrantless physical
searches.171 Whether Congress can place any limits on the exercise of
Presidential powers is an open question. 72 Nevertheless, passage of
S. 3197, with the disclaimer, would demonstrate that even Congress is
165. The Church committee recommended compliance with Omnibus as a prerequisite to
such surveillance. See notes 148-50 supra and accompanying text. Omnibus requires, inter ala,
that prior to issuing a warrant the presiding judge find probable cause to believe that a particular
offense is being or has been committed, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1970); that the applicant will
obtain "particular communications concerning that offense," id. § 2518(3)(b); and, that the facili-
ties subject to the requested surveillance are connected with that offense, id. § 2518(3)(d). See also
notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text. Specifically, S. 3197 would permit electronic surveil-
lance of noncriminal activity. Unlike Omnibus, the bill requires probable cause for believing that
the subject of surveillance is a foreign agent. Compare S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2525(a)(3)(i),
with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1970).
166. S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2526(b).
167. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 148-49, 165 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
170. S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2528(a).
171. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. The bill disclaims any limits on the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to acquire foreign intelligence information by means other than elec-
tronic surveillance; the Executive, therefore, would lack any incentive to discontinue physical
surveillance. Senator Bidwell characterized S. 3197 as, "in effect a 'backdoor' charter for foreign
intelligence activities.' FO rEIGN INTELLIGENCE ACT REPORT, supra note 83, at 73. At the Senate
hearings on S. 3197, former Attorney General Levi justified the disclaimer as to Presidential pow-
ers by stating his belief that "there is an area where the Congress can establish procedures to
govern the exercise of power and I think this bill does that. And there is undoubtedly an area
where it cannot, and this bill should recognize that." 1976 Hearings, supra note 93, at 20.
172. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (Congress cannot limit Presidential power to
grant pardons); Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 106 (1926) (Court upholds Presidential power to
remove a postmaster in violation of a statute requiring prior Senate approval); L. HENKiN, supra
note 64, at 92-94. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 318, 320
(1936) (President has "plenary and exclusive power" over foreign relations). But see notes 174-78
infra and accompanying text.
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uncertain as to the limits it can impose on the President's conduct of
foreign affairs. 1
73
Congress conceivably could assert concurrent power over foreign se-
curity surveillance by implication from the constitutional powers to:
"define and punish. . .Offenses against the Law of Nations;" 174 "reg-
ulate commerce with foreign Nations;"' 75  "declare War;"' 7 6  and,
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution" all powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." 177  The
Supreme Court has stated that the conduct of foreign relations is com-
mitted by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches. 178
Thus, the concurrent powers theory has both constitutional and judicial
support. As S. 3197 stands, its disclaimer provision would merely per-
petuate the law's imprecision in this area.
On May 18, 1977, Senator Kennedy, supported by Attorney General
Bell, introduced S. 1566. 17 As the Church Committee suggested, S.
1566 distinguishes citizens and resident aliens from foreigners in gen-
173. This uncertainty can be detected in the Senate Report on S. 3197 which describes the
bill's prefatory language on presidential powers as "designed to make it absolutely clear that this
section constitutes neither a grant of, nor a limitation on, such power nor a congressional recogni-
tion of such power." FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AcT REPORT, supra note 83, at 46-47. It ex-
plained this position by stating that "[o]nly the Supreme Court can ultimately decide whether such
power exists. Accordingly, the committee emphasizes the neutrality of the prefatory language."
Id. Senator Biden recognized that "[slection 2528 of the bill preserves intact the concept of inher-
ent presidential authority to spy on Americans. This was of course the basic argument in defense
of many Watergate illegalities. It is the only authority for the Federal government's huge Na-
tional Security Agency electronic surveillance program." Id. at 73.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 64, at 72-74.
175. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generall L. HENKIN, supra note 64, at 69-71.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 64, at 80-81.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. But see note 172 supra and accompanying text.
178. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). See also Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (state alien inheritance law unconstitutional because it intrudes "into the
field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and Congress"). Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57-58 (1958) (Nationality Act of 1940 enacted pursuant to Congress' power
to regulate relations with foreign nations); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1972) (Congress can limit President's foreign affairs powers in domestic situation with foreign
affairs implications); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 116, 182 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1967) (Congress can legislate in the area of foreign affairs). See generally L.
HENKIN, supra note 64, at 94-107; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and Law Makers: The Law of the
Land and Foreign Relation.r, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1959). S. 3197 adopts the concurrent powers
theory contingently; limiting the President's power to use electronic surveillance in foreign secur-
ity cases only if the courts determine that this power exists. S. 3197, supra note 157, § 2528(a) &
(b). See FOREIGN SECURrrY AcT REPORT, supra note 83, at 47-48.
179. See note 106 supra.
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eral. 180  For a citizen or resident alien to be classified as a foreign
agent, the government would have to establish probable cause to be-
lieve that the suspect knowingly provided assistance to a foreign power
in a manner harmful to the United States.' 8' Foreigners could be
classified as foreign agents simply by being officers or employees of a
foreign nation.' 82  Like S. 3197, the bill would permit the issuance of
warrants upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the target is a
foreign agent. 8 ' It does not, however, require a showing of probable
cause to believe that foreign intelligence information essential to na-
tional security will be obtained.'84
Although S. 1566 disclaims any limitation on foreign security sur-
veillance by means other than electronics, 185 it does not contain a dis-
180. CHURCH Comm. REPORT II, supra note 147, at 327-28 (Recommendations 52 & 54).
See notes 148-56 supra and accompanying text.
181. The section of the bill that applies to citizens and resident aliens defines "[a]gent of a
foreign power" as any person who
(i) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of a for-
eign power, which activities involve or will involve a violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States;
(ii) knowingly engages in activities that involve sabotage or terrorism for or on be-
half of a foreign power;
(iii) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or intelligence network of a
foreign power, knowingly collects or transmits information or material to an intelligence
service or intelligence network of a foreign power in a manner intended to conceal the
nature of such information or material or the fact of such transmission or collection,
under circumstances which indicate the transmission of such information or material
would be harmful to the security of the United States, or that lack of knowledge by the
United States of such collection or transmission would be harmful to the security of the
United States; or
(iv) conspires with or knowingly aids or abets any person engaged in activities de-
scribed in subsections B(i) or (iii) above.
S. 1566, supra note 106, § 2521(b)(2)(B).
182. The section of the bill that applies to foreigners defines "[aigent of a foreign power" as
any person other than a citizen or resident alien who
(i) is an officer or employee of a foreign power;
(ii) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of a
foreign power under circumstances which indicate that such activities would be harmful
to the security of the United States; or
(iii) conspires with or knowingly aids or abets a person described in paragraph (ii)
above.
Id. § 2521(b)(2)(A).
183. See id. § 2524(a)(7)(A, B, & C).
184. Id. See also note 160 supra and accompanying text.
185. The bill states that
[n]othing contained in this chapter, or section 605 of the Communication Act of 1934 (47
U.S.C. 605) shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United States Government
of foreign intelligence information from international communications by a means other
than electronic surveillance as defined in section 2521(b)(6) of this title.
S. 1566, supra note 106, at 28.
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claimer as to Presidential powers.1 6  The bill clearly provides that,
along with Omnibus, it would constitute the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance could be conducted in the United States. 187 Al_
though the bill fails to espouse the concurrent powers theory,'88 its fail-
ure to mention inherent Presidential powers implies an assertion of
congressional authority over foreign security surveillance.8 9  It there-
fore leaves the door open for future legislation limiting Executive dis-
cretion.
The distinction between United States citizens, resident aliens, and
other foreigners is troublesome. Under certain circumstances, United
States citizens would still be subject to legal surveillance without the
protections of Omnibus.190 Foreign employees such as ambassadors or
foreign government business representatives certainly have frequent
conversations with American citizens. Such conversations could be in-
tercepted without the protections of Omnibus if a warrant were ob-
tained against the foreign employee under S. 1566 procedures. 191
Because the bill does not require a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that essential foreign intelligence information is likely to be ob-
tained,192 the government might be tempted to use a foreign security
rationale to acquire information on United States citizens.' 93
186. At the Senate hearings on S. 1566 Attorney General Griffin Bell recognized the lack of a
disclaimer as a specific area "in which this bill increases protections for Americans as against [S.
31971." 1977 Hearings, supra note 53, at 14-15. Senator Kennedy stated that S. 1566 "expressly
limits whatever inherent power the President may have to engage in such electronic surveillance in
the United States."Id. at 2. When Senator Thurmond, however, asked Attorney General Bell if it
was his "position that even though this language is deleted from the bill, the inherent presidential
power is preserved as interpreted by the courts?" the Attorney General responded: "Yes. Be-
cause we can't change the Constitution." Id. at 26.
187. S. 1566, supra note 106, at 28.
188. See notes 174-78 supra and accompanying text.
189. See note 186 supra.
190. See notes 154 & 165 supra.
191. As stated by the Church Committee:
Because wiretaps and bugs are capable of intercepting all conversations on a particular
telephone or in a particular area, American citizens with whom the foreign targets com-
municate are also overheard, and information irrelevant to the purpose of the surveil-
lance may be collected and disseminated to senior administration oficials.
CHURCH COMM. REPORT III, supra note 24, at 312. Specifically, the Committee noted that Presi-
dents Nixon and Johnson were supplied with information on Congressmen through FBI surveil-
lance of foreign establishments. Id. at 313-14. President Johnson obtained information on a
prominent member of the Republican party through physical and electronic surveillance of the
South Vietnamese Embassy. Id. at 314-15. See also 1977 Hearings, supra note 53, at 94-95
(comments of Morton H. Halperin).
192. See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
193. Suppose that an employee of a foreign embassy was a close friend of a political adver-
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Furthermore, the fourth amendment does not distinguish between
citizens and foreigners. It protects "persons."'' 94  During the legisla-
tive hearings on S. 1566, Attorney General Bell admitted that "[t]here
is no doubt that the fourth amendment protects aliens in the United
States . . . ,,.9 Yet, according to the Attorney General, S. 1566
satisfies the fourth amendment by requiring a judicial warrant prior to
the implementation of surveillance against foreigners, even though the
warrant may issue under a lesser showing than is required for Ameri-
can citizens or resident aliens. 196
The case law provides support both for and against the Attorney
General's position. The Supreme Court has stated that an alien is enti-
tled to an "ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our
society."'197 Yet, it has also afforded full fourth amendment protec-
tions to aliens illegally in the United States. 198 Moreover, the Court
has declared alienage a suspect classification, protecting aliens from
arbitrary and discriminatory governmental action.199 Thus, whether the
Court would uphold S. 1566's distinction between United States citi-
zens, resident aliens, and foreigners is an open question.
sary of the President. Under S. 1566, the government could legally tap the telephone of the
foreign embassy employee, see note 191 supra and accompanying text, in hopes of overhearing
politically valuable or incriminating conversations between the two friends. By requiring a show-
ing of probable cause to believe that essential foreign security information is likely to be obtained
by the proposed search, such executive abuses could be curbed. Cf. United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (fourth amendment contemplates prior judicial
determination, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (fourth amendment requires neutral determination of probable
cause).
194. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
195. 1977 Hearings, supra note 53, at 16.
196. Id.
197. Johnson v. Eisentrayer, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). See also Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 232-34 (1970) (dictum) (permissible to arrest alien, prior to deportation, on administra-
tive warrant which failed to meet fourth amendment requirements).
198. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (illegal alien afforded full fourth
amendment protections). See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379-72 (1971) (denial of
welfare benefits based on alienage held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment); Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (fourth amendment protects aliens while in the United States), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971).
199. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court stated that "classifications
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular" minority
... for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Id. at 372. On the rights of
aliens generally, see L. HENKIN, supra note 64, at 254-55; Gordon, The,41ien and the Constiltutlon,
9 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1972).
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Perhaps the most serious defect in S. 1566 is that like S. 3197 it dis-
claims any limitation on foreign security surveillance by means other
than electronic surveillance. This leaves serious questions as to the
legality of warrantless foreign security physical searches unresolved.
Thus, even if one of these bills were enacted, the foreign security issue
would remain alive.200 Resolution would ultimately depend on an ap-
propriate case reaching the Supreme Court or further legislation. In
the interim, the Executive can continue to assert the validity of war-
rantless physical foreign security searches.
C. Why Congress Should Act
In January, 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12036 re-
garding United States intelligence activities.2"1 The order asserts that
intelligence activities "must be conducted in a manner that preserves
and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties."'2 2
Yet, it would permit warrantless intelligence activities when the Presi-
dent and Attorney General authorize such activities upon a finding of
probable cause to believe the target is an "agent of a foreign power. 20 3
The order leaves the term "agent of a foreign power" undefined, and
permits both warrantless physical and electronic surveillance.204  Fur-
thermore, it fails to require probable cause to believe information
deemed essential to national security is likely to be obtained.
The order is ripe for Executive abuse. It provides no guidelines for
determining who is an "agent of a foreign power." 25  Many individu-
als with merely a business, personal, or political connection to a foreign
nation could conceivably be included. Its substantive protections are
also unclear. The Executive offers only its good faith. Unfortunately,
200. Neither S. 3197, supra note 157, nor S. 1566, supra note 106, limit physical searches.
The Executive could conceivably continue to assert the validity of warrantless foreign security
physical searches after the passage of either or both bills.
201. Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978).
202. Id. at 3684.
203. Id. at 3685.
204. The Order states that certain activities, including electronic and physical surveillance for
which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement rather than intelligence
purposes, shall not be undertaken against a United States person without a judicial warrant unless
the President has authorized the type of activity involved and the Attorney General has both
approved the particular activity and determined that there is probable cause to believe that the
United States person is an agent of a foreign power. Id.
205. See.4 New Loophole Entitled "Agent of Foreign Power,'St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 29,
1978, at D3, col. 1 (lists Clark Clifford, Jane Fonda, and Governor Jerry Brown as individuals
who might be classified as agents of a foreign power).
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executive good faith is an inadequate protection for individual consti-
tutional rights.2°
The Executive, however, has indicated a willingness to abide by con-
gressional legislation placing reasonable limits on foreign security sur-
veillance.2 °7 The existing potential for executive abuse should be
sufficient to prompt legislative action. Yet independent of this, Con-
gress should act because of the possibility of restrictive judicial reaction
to the foreign security issue.208
Should a foreign security issue reach the Supreme Court, its decision
could take a number of directions. The Court could recognize inher-
ent Presidential powers and determine that the Executive is exempt
from fourth amendment prohibitions in foreign security cases. 2°9  The
Court might limit its holding by recognizing an exception to the war-
rant requirement based on the special circumstances and needs of na-
tional defense.2  In either situation, if the Court relied solely on
inherent executive power, subsequent congressional action would be
ineffective. 21' Alternatively, the Court could determine that foreign
policy decisions are within the domain of the political branches of gov-
ernment and recognize congressional as well as executive authority.212
206. The fourth amendment owes its origin to its framers' fears of potential executive abuse of
warrantless search powers. See note 51 supra.
207. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 53, at 13-17, 26 (statement and comments of Attorney
General Bell).
208. Expeditious congressional action is also needed because violations of individual privacy,
under the guise of a good faith belief in the legality of warrantless foreign security searches, will
likely remain without civil remedy until the law is clarified. Cf. United States v. Barker, 546
F.2d 940, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no civil liability because defendants reasonably believed their
surreptitious warrantless search was legally authorized by the President); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 444
F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1978) (on remand from 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 944 (1976)) (because the Zweibon surveillance was prior to Keith, it was reasonable, at the
time, to believe that warrantless national security surveillance was legal; therefore, no civil liabil-
ity should attach); Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838, 842 (D.D.C. 1976) (surveillance prior
to Keith).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 760
(1974).
210. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
211. See note 172 supra and accompanying text. -Alternatively, the Court might follow
Zweibon and hold all foreign security searches subject to the warrant requirement. In that situa-
tion, prior congressional action would also not be very meaningful.
212. See text accompanying notes 174-78. For a summary of cases in which the Court de-
ferred to the political branches in the area of foreign affairs, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-
13 (1962). The Court in Baker stated that
[tihere are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching on foreign rela-
tions are political questions. Not only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on
standards that defy judicial application or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstra-
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S. 1566 is needed for its definition of those who are to be classified
as agents of a foreign power.213  Both S. 1566 and Executive Order
12036 allow a warrant to issue on a lesser showing of involvement in
foreign intelligence activities for foreigners than is required for United
States citizens or resident aliens.214 As stated earlier, the constitutional
validity of this classification is an open question.215 Yet, given the
vagueness of Executive Order 12036,216 S. 1566 would at least provide
more definitive procedural protections for the rights of United States
citizens and resident aliens.217
V. CONCLUSION
Neither Congress nor the Court has assumed responsibility for elimi-
nating the current confusion surrounding foreign security surveillance.
Thus, the Executive may now assert the legality of warrantless elec-
tronic and physical surveillance in cases involving foreign agents or
collaborators. This state of affairs is unacceptable. From Entick v.
Carringlon218 to the surreptitious activities of President Nixon,21 one
lesson cuts across history: Executive discretion is subject to abuse.
Presidential power is too often used for private political gain at the
expense of individual rights z.2 ° The fourth amendment was adopted to
bly committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely demand
single-voiced statement of the Government's views.
Id. at 211. The Court, however, noted that it would be an error "to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches on foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. The Court
has withheld judgment as to the validity of congressional classifications of aliens for admittance
into this country even though the individuals contesting the classifications asserted deprivations of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., FialloIv. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (Court deferred to political
btanches although appellants alleged that immigration classification violated due process right to
control familial relationship); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (Court deferred to
political branches although appellees alleged that Executive's exclusion of a visitor violated his
first amendment rights). It is conceivable that the Court might defer to the political branches on
the issue of the constitutionality of warrantless foreign security searches.
213. See notes 180-82 supra and accompanying text.
214. Compare id., with notes 204-05 supra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 194-99 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 205-06 supra and accompanying text.
217. See notes 181-82 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 191-93 supra and ac-
companying text. The contention here is not that the protections provided by S. 1566 are
sufficient to protect individual constitutional rights, but merely that it provides more protection
than Executive Order No. 12036.
218. 10 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). See note 51 supra.
219. See HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NiXON, PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Rep. No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 146-47 (1974); 119 Cong.
Rec. 41864 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Nelson).
220. See notes 129 & 191 supra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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prevent such abuse.221
This Note suggests that all warrantless searches and seizures author-
ized by the Executive are unconstitutional. The District of Columbia
Circuit's approach in Zweibon v. Mitchell illustrates the fallacies in the
reasoning of federal courts that have upheld warrantless surveillance.
Potential abuse by the Executive of a foreign security exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement demands expeditious action
by Congress or the Court.
On .4pril20, 1978, the Senate passed S. 1566 See note 106 supra. As
this Note went to press, the House had yet to act on its version of the
bill
4ndrew Puzder
221. See note 51 supra.
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